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Iran'sPolicyTowardsAfghanistan
MohsenM. Milani

Since 1979, Iran's objectivesin Afghanistanhave changedas Afghanistan's
domesticlandscapechanged.Still, Iran has consistentlysoughtto see a stable
and independentAfghanistan,with Heratas a bufferzone and with a Tehranfriendlygovernmentin Kabul,a governmentthatreflectstherichethnicdiversity
of the country.Towardthose and other goals, Iran has created "spheresof
influence"inside Afghanistan.During the Soviet occupation(1979-88), Iran
createdan "ideologicalsphereof influence"by empoweringthe Shi'ites. Iran
then created a "politicalsphere of influence"by unifyingthe Dari/Persianspeakingminorities,who ascendedto power. Iranianpolicies addedfuel to the
ferociouscivil war in the 1990s.Astonishinglyslow to recognizethethreatposed
by theTaliban,Iranhelpedcreatea "sphereof resistance" to counterthe "Kabul"axis bysupportingtheNorthernAlliance.Sincetheliberation
Islamabad-Riyadh
of Afghanistan,Iranhas also establishedan "economicsphereof influence" by
engagingin thereconstruction
ofAfghanistan.Today,Iran'sgoals are topressure
theAfghangovernmentto distanceitselffromWashington,
andforIranto become
the hubfor the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and
Afghanistan,CentralAsia, India, and China. WhileIran has been guilty of
in somecriticalaspectsof itsforeignpolicy,itsoverall
extremism
andadventurism
Afghanpolicyhas contributedmoreto moderationandstabilitythanto extremism
and instability.
here is considerableconsensusamongexpertsthat Iranhas played an important
role in the tumultuouseventsin Afghanistansince the brutaloccupationof thatcountry by the Soviet Army in 1979. What is being debatedis the exact impact, and
consequences,of thatrole. Whatfollows is a contributionto this lingeringdebate.
Since its founding,the IslamicRepublicof Iranhas developeda security-centered, two-layeredforeign policy to expand and protectits interestsas well as to
neutralizethe perceivedthreatposedby the UnitedStates,a threatTehranhas consistently regardedas existential.The foundationof this foreignpolicy is based on the
T
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pragmaticrecognitionof the existenceof a colossal powerdifferential,particularlyin
the militaryarena,betweenIranandthe US. Iranhas persistentlysoughtnot to allow
hostile bilateralrelationsto descend into a militaryconfrontationbetween the two
countries.Additionally,in an effort to build an effective deterrentagainstthe US,
Iranhas developedunconventionalandasymmetricstrategiesin bothits militaryand
foreign policy arenas.One such strategyis to create"spheresof influence," buffer
andopen organizazones, as well as a web of bothinformalandformal,underground
tions aroundIran's troubledneighborhood,and beyond its borders.This strategy
allows Iranto projectits powerandenhanceits interests,supportIslamicmovements,
createa defensiveand sometimesinvisible wall outsideits borders,and positionits
friendly forces and proxies beyond its bordersagainstthose who threatenits own
survival.In its policy towardAfghanistansince 1979, Iranhas employedthe most
importantelements of this strategyand has createddifferentkinds of "spheresof
influence"in thatcountry.

CREATINGAN IDEOLOGICALSPHEREOF INFLUENCE,1979-88
In July of 1973,AfghanKing ZaherShah(1933-73) was overthrownin a coup
stagedby MuhammadDaudKhan,who thendemolishedthe monarchy,establisheda
republic,and began flirting with Moscow.' For MuhammadReza Shah Pahlaviof
Iran(1941-79), the coup was as an ominoussign of Soviet machinationsto dominate
Afghanistan.At first,he contemplatedorganizinga rebellionfromWesternAfghanistan to restorethe monarchy.2He quicklyabandonedthe plan, however,largelybecause he viewed ZaherShah to be disgustinglytimid and inept, even thoughhe reportedly providedlimited financial supportfor the exiled king in Italy.3He ultimately opted to appeaseDaud by offering Kabula lucrativeassistancepackagein
1974.4Ironically,as Daudwas movingcloserto Iran,he was overthrownby a coup in
Aprilof 1978, and nine monthslater,MuhammadReza Shah,too, was dethronedby
a popularrevolutionthatelevatedAyatollahRouhollahKhomeinito power.'

1. See HafizullahEmadi,State, Revolutionand Superpowersin Afghanistan(New York:Praeger,
1990).
2. AssadollahAlam, Khofteghohay-eMan Ba Shah [My Conversationswith the Shah] Vol. II,
(Tehran:Tarh-eNou, 1992), pp. 490, 491 and495.
3. AccordingtoAlam, the Shahorderedhim to pay $10,000 permonthto ZaherShahin Italyandto
buy the exiled King a house as well. The money was to come from the Iraniangovernment's"secret
budget."Alam is ratherambiguousaboutwhetherthe exiled King receivedthe financialsupportfrom
Iran. Alam, Khofteghohay,pp. 569 and537-538.
4. See AbdulrezaH. Mahdavi,Siyasat-e Kharege-yeIran Dar Douran-e Pahlavi [Iran's Foreign
Policy During the Pahlavi Era] (Tehran:Alborz, 1979), pp. 471-473.
5. Harrisonarguedthatthe Shah'spolicies "triggeredthe chain of events culminatingin the overthrowof the MohammadDaud regime."See Selig S. Harrison,"TheShah, Not Kremlin,Touchedoff
Afghan Coup,"TheWashingtonPost, May 13, 1979.
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The Soviet invasionof Afghanistanin December1979 createda conundrumfor
AyatollahKhomeini.6He could neitherremainreticentaboutthe invasionof an Islamic countryby "atheists,"nor could he affordto antagonizethe Soviet Union.The
beginningof the Soviet occupationcoincidedwith the US hostage crisis in Tehran
thatterminateddecadesof strategiccooperationbetweenIranand the UnitedStates
and regrettablytransformedthe two formerallies into bitterenemies.7As Iranbecame increasinglyisolatedduringthe hostagecrisis, it began to tilt in favor of the
Soviet Union in orderto neutralizethe impendingUS threat.Thus, Iranstaunchly
condemnedthe occupationof Afghanistananddemandedthe Soviet withdrawal,but
it was exceptionallyvigilant not to allow its policy towardAfghanistanto damage
irrevocablyits otherwiseamiablerelationswith Moscow.8
Afghanistan,however,was nota topforeignpolicypriorityfor Iran,eventhough
approximately1 to 1.5 millionrefugeeshadfled to Iran. Winningthe warwith Iraq,
a goal thatwas basedmoreon revolutionaryromanticismthanreality,hadbecome a
dangerousfixationfor Iran'sclerical leadershipthatovershadowedall otherissues.
When Iranexpelled Iraqiforces from its territoryand penetratedinto Iraqin 1982,
Tehransquandereda propitiousopportunityto end the warandinsteadmadea strategic blunderby demandingIraqicapitulation. Irancontinuedthe warfor anothersix
long years,a useless andinsanewarthatcausedthe deathof thousandsof peopleand
the destructionof muchof the infrastructures
of both countries.
Iranplayed its "Afghancard"as an effective means to gain concessionsfrom
Moscow, to limit the Soviet supply of armsto Iraqduringthe eight-yearIran-Iraq
War,to counterthe loomingUS threat,andto tamethe activitiesof the pro-Moscow
Tudehpartyas Khomeinistsconsolidatedpowerin Iran. The essence of Iran'spolicy
towardAfghanistanwas to createan "ideologicalsphereof influence"by mobilizing
and energizingthe Afghan Shi'ites, which comprisedabout20% of the population,
while barelydealingwiththe Communistgovernmentof Afghanistan.Tehran'sShi'ithehistoricallyoppressedandmarginalized
centeredandparochialpolicytransformed
Hazaras,Qizilbash,andFarsiwansShi'itesintoa disciplinedandcohesiveforce.Tehran
providedfinancialsupportto the Shi'ites, gave them hope, traineda generationof
activists,and establishedclose links with the Afghan 'ulama.9 The presenceof Afghan refugees in IranprovidedTehranwith a uniqueopportunityto trainan indig-

6. See R.K. Ramazani,RevolutionaryIran:Challengeand Responsein the MiddleEast (Baltimore:
Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1986); and Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran'sAmbivalentWorldRole'"in
ComparativeForeignPolicy,StevenW. Hook,ed. (New Jersey:PrenticeHall, 2002), pp. 219-244.
7. See MohsenM. Milani,"TheHostageCrisis,"EncyclopediaIranica,Vol.VII (NewYork:Columbia University,2004), pp. 525-535.
8. Khomeiniallegedlyagreednot to incitethe Soviet Muslimsagainstthe Soviet Union in exchange
for a pledge by Moscow to veto any UN sanctionsagainstIran. See AdamTarock,"ThePolitics of the
Pipeline,"ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol. 20, No. 4, August 1999, p. 805.
9. HafizullahEmadi,"ExportingIran'sRevolution,"MiddleEasternStudies,Vol.31, No. 1, January
1995, pp. 1-12. Emadi claims thatthe Afghan Shi'ites receivedmilitarytrainingin Iranfor up to six
monthsandreceiveda smallmonetarycompensationas well. Some of them,he claims,weresentto fight
Iraq.Emadi,"Exporting,"p. 8.
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enous Afghan force that was to be relocatedto Afghanistanat the opportunemoment.10
Ironically,the Soviet occupyingforces did not dominatethe Hazarjatregionin
centralAfghanistan,the strongholdof the Shi'i community.'1It is not clear if this
"hands-off'policy was adoptedby Moscowbecauseof the growingthreatemanating
from the Pakistani-basedIslamic Resistance,or if it was a concession to Ayatollah
Khomeini.Whateverthe reason,this policy permittedIranto createa sophisticated
networkinside Afghanistan,reinvigoratingindigenousorganizations,and creating
new,disciplinedforces, such as Hizbollah.Iran'sinvestmentspaidoff whenthe eight
Iran-basedAfghan-Shi'igroupsformedan alliancein Juneof 1987.
The most revealingaspect of Iran'sAfghanpolicy was not what Irandid, but
whatIrandid not do. Iranrefusedto becomea "frontline"stateandparticipatein the
axis thatgenerouslysupportedthe Pakistani-based
"Washington-Islamabad-Riyadh"
Resistanceagainstthe Soviet occupation.While Irandid not underminethe Resistanceandpubliclysupportedit as a legitimatemovementagainstan illegitimateoccupation,theleadershipin Tehranmadea precariousdistinctionbetweentheResistance's
threemainfinanciersandorganizers.Iranenjoyedgood relationswith Pakistanunder
PresidentZia al-Haq, hoping to keep him distant from Washington.'2Ironically,
Pakistan'sInter-ServicesIntelligenceDirectorate(ISI) was the main conduitfor the
distributionof US and Saudifinancialaid to the Resistance.Even US weapons,includingthe deadlystingermissiles thatparalyzedthe Soviet militaryin Afghanistan,
were distributedthroughthe ISI.'3
Iranconsideredthe Saudi-USallianceto be a gravesecuritythreatandsaw their
fingerprintsall over the Resistance.'4It is estimatedthatthe US gave $3 billionover
the courseof the 1980sto the Resistance,'5while SaudiArabiagave nearly$4 billion,
a sum that did not include the supportgiven by individualSaudis or by charitable
16 SaudiArabiawas also providinglavishfinancialsupportto lubricate
organizations.
Iraqi PresidentSaddamHusayn's war machine against Iran.Iran was particularly
alarmedaboutthe invigorationof the madrasasystem, which was spreadingradical
WahabismamongPakistanisandAfghanrefugeesin Pakistan.While KhomeiniconsideredWahabismas "America'sIslam,"for Washington,Wahabism,with its uncom10. Cooley claims that some 15 trainingcamps were establishedin Iran. John K. Cooley, Unholy
Wars:Afghanistan,Americaand InternationalTerrorism(London:Pluto Press, 2000), p. 103.
11. See SayedAskarMousavi,TheHazarasofAfghanistan:An Historical, Cultural,Economicand
Political Study(New York:St. MartinPress, 1997).
12.ValiNasr,'The IranianRevolutionandChangesin Islamismin Pakistan,IndiaandAfghanistan,"
in N. R. KeddieandR. Matthee,eds., Iranand the SurroundingWorld(Seattle:Universityof Washington Press, 2002), pp. 327-352.
13. Fora perceptiveanalysisof the impactof the role of US weaponson theAfghancrisis, see Alan
J. Kuperman,'The StingerMissile andU.S. Interventionin Afghanistan,"Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 114, No. 2 (Summer1999), pp. 219-263.
14. OliverRoy, "Afghanistan:
An IslamicWarof Resistance,"in Fundamentalismand the State,M.
Martyand R.S. Appleby,eds. (Chicago:The Universityof Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 490-510.
15. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War,Inc. (New York:Free Press, 2001), p. 68.
16. AhmadRashid, Taliban(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 2001), p. 197.
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promisinganti-Shi'iproclivities,was perceivedas a deterrentagainstCommunismas
well as an effective counter-forceagainst Khomeinism.Thus, the US encouraged
Muslim volunteersfrom the Islamic world to join the Resistance.The US was so
obsessed with turningAfghanistaninto the Soviet Union's own Vietnam,as well as
underminingrevolutionaryIran,that it convenientlyignoredthe ideologicalrigidity
and extremismof the Resistance.'7One of the "unintendedconsequences"of that
policy was that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these militants,
emboldenedby the victory in Afghanistan,shifted their anti-Communismattitude
towardsan anti-Americanstanceandbecamefoot soldiersof the globalJihadimovementand al-Qa'ida.'8

CREATINGA POLITICALSPHEREOF INFLUENCE,1988-1996
OccupyingAfghanistanprovedinfinitelymore difficultand costly for the Soviet Unionthaninvadingit. Unableto stabilizeAfghanistan,the RedArmywas forced
to leave, acceleratingthe auspiciouscollapseof the Soviet Union.In the international
negotiationsfor the Soviet withdrawal,Washingtonand Moscow had both pledged
not to interferein Afghanistan,which they both consideredto be devoidof any economic and strategicvalue. This doctrineof non-interference
andbenignneglect created a dangerousvacuumthattransformedthatcountryinto a lethalbattlegroundfor
a proxy war amongIran,SaudiArabia,and Pakistan.
SaudiArabiaandPakistansoughtto underminethe incumbentNajibollahgovernmentand install a friendly,obedientgovernment.Their ambitions,however,exceededtheircapabilities.SaudiArabiasawAfghanistanas an ideologicalspringboard
to expandWahabismthroughoutAfghanistanand CentralAsia, to neutralizeIran's
revolutionarymessage, and to become the leader of the Islamic world. Pakistan's
main goal was to installa Pushtun-dominated
government,which would ideally accept the Durandline thatdemarcatedthe bordersbetweenPakistanandAfghanistan
whenPakistanwas createdandwouldallow Pakistanto expandits sphereof influence
into CentralAsia and possibly to become a lucrativebridgeconnectingCentralAsia
and the ArabianSea. Such a governmentcould have also providedPakistanwith a
"strategicdepth"whichit wouldrequirein any warwith India,its "perennialenemy."
Iran'sobjectivesclashedwithPakistan'sandSaudiArabia's.Afterthe end of the
Iraq-IranWar,Iranbecamemore assertivein Afghanistan;its foreignpolicy became
isolationandimproving
somewhatpragmaticin the hopeof lesseningits international
relationswith its neighborsand with the West.'9Whatdid not change were Iran's
friendlyrelationswith Russiaand Iran'sperceptionof the US as a nationalsecurity
threat.In that vein, 'Ali AkbarHashemi-Rafsanjani,
Speakerof the Majliswho had
his eyes fixatedon the presidency,announcedin Moscowin the summerof 1987 that
17. A US CongressionalResolution (October 1984) referredto the membersof the Resistanceas
"freedomfighters."See Kuperman,"TheStingerMissle,"p. 227.
18. Bergen,Holy War,p. 90.
19. See Shireen Hunter,"Iran'sPragmaticRegionalPolicy,"Journalof InternationalAffairs,Vol.
56, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 133-147.
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"we are preparedto assist you, so that after your departurethere will be no US
Iran'sotherobjectiveswere to insurestabilityon its
dominationin Afghanistan."20
borderswith Afghanistanas it was rebuildingits own shatteredeconomy,to support
the establishmentof a Tehran-friendly
governmentin Kabul,to reducethe influence
of PakistanandespeciallySaudiArabiain Afghanistan,andto transformitself into a
criticaltradeand energybridgebetweenCentralAsia, Afghanistan,and the Persian
Gulf.
Iranconsistentlycalled for nationalreconciliationin Afghanistanand the formationof an inclusive,multi-ethnicgovernment.At the sametime, Iransubstantially
expandedits politicalsphereof influenceby creativelyexploitinglanguageas a tool
non-Pushtun
minorities.TheseDari-speaking
to unifythesizableDari/Persian-speaking,
minoritiesthus became a formidablecounterforceagainstthe Pushtuns,who were
supportedby Pakistanand SaudiArabia.
To solidifyits new sphereof influence,Tehranformulateda two-prongedpolicy.
On one hand,Iranencouragedthe variousShi'i groupsto form the Hezb-e Wahdat
(Partyof Unity) in 1990, which becamethe largestShi'i organization.On the other
hand,Iran,in 1991, signedan importantagreementwithTajikistanandAfghanistan's
Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society), a large organizationunder the leadership of
RabbaniandAhmadShahMas'ud.A majorsteptowardunitywas taken
Burhanuddin
the
when Tajikcommander,AhmadShahMas'ud,along withAbdulRashidDostam,
an Uzbekmilitaryleader,formeda loose alliancewiththe Hezb-eWahdatandseveral
smallerShi'i groups.Two days beforea teamof UN-selectedAfghanswas to establish a new post-Sovietgovernment,the allianceunderthe leadershipof Mas'udstaged
a preemptivestrikeandtoppledNajibullah'sgovernmentin Aprilof 1992.Twomonths
later, Rabbanibecame Presidentof this new government.While Iran'srole in the
putsch by Mas'ud remainsambiguous,his victory would probablynot have been
possible withoutIran'srole in unifyingthe non-Pushtuns.
Iranunhesitatinglyrecognizedthe new government,which was controlledby
the non-PushtunDari-speakers.Muchto Iran'sexasperation,however,the new governmentneithergovernedAfghanistaneffectivelynor saved it from a ferociouscivil
war.The casus belli of the civil war was ethnic rivalry,reinforcedby warlordism.
The controlof the governmentby the non-Pushtuns,for example,generatedvenomous resentmentamongthe Pushtuns,who hadhistoricallydominatedAfghanpolitics.
Moreover,the polycephalicmovementagainstthe Soviet occupationhadempowered
many ambitiouswarlords.These warlordsexploitedethnic rivalryto advancetheir
own agendas,andformedalliancesof conveniencewith the samerapidityandopportunismthat they as soon betrayed.21They had createdtheirown little fiefdoms and
were determinedto defy any centralizationof authority.
Duringthe civil war,competitionintensifiedbetweenPakistanandSaudiArabia

20. Quotedin Emadi,Exporting,p. 10.
21. For details, see Ali A. Jalali"Afghanistan:The Anatomyof an Ongoing Conflict,"Parameters
(US Anny WarCollege Quarterly),Vol. 31, Issue I (Spring2001), pp. 85-98.
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on the one side, andIranon the oppositeside.22BothPakistanandSaudiArabia,who
felt embarrassinglyoutmaneuveredby Mas'ud'spreemptivestrike,viewed the new
Afghan governmentas being suspiciouslyand dangerouslyaligned with Iran.The
first warlord they sought for destabilizationof the governmentwas Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar,the single largestrecipientof Saudi and US aid in the 1980s. A selfcreatedutterchaosandformedfleeting
proclaimeddefenderof thePushtuns,Hekmatyar
allianceswith anyonewilling to underminethe government.
Iransoughtto strengthenthe Afghangovernmentas well as the Shi'ites andto
find a peacefulresolutionto a violentcivil war.This Herculeantaskrequiredthe kind
of resourcesanddiplomaticskills thatIranlacked.Additionally,Iranianpolicy failed
becauseof erraticchangesin the policies of the Afghangovernmentand Iran'sown
inconsistentmaneuvers.Pushedin differentdirectionsby constituenciesthathad irreconcilableagendas,theAfghangovernmentalienatedtoo manyforces andfailedto
form any enduringalliances with the majorplayers in the civil war. Its different
approachestowardIranare a case in point:Rabbanifollowed a more cautiousand
conciliatoryapproachtowardIran,andplayedthe foreignpowersagainstone another
in the hopes of receiving concessions from all of them. Mas'ud, however,played
hardballwith Iran. Mas'ud,who was receivingfinancialsupportfromPakistanand
SaudiArabia,slowly distancedhimself from Tehranand bitterlycomplainedabout
Iranianinterventionin his country.This inconsistentpolicy by KabulangeredTehran,
which respondedby increasingits supportto the Shi'ites as well as to variouswarlords, includingGeneralDostum, Isma'il Khan,and even Hekmatyar.This erratic
policy by Iranprovedto add high-octanefuel to the civil war.
The Afghangovernmentalso was reluctantto sharepowerwith the Shi'ites or
Pushtuns,as Iranhad persistentlydemanded.In fact, the governmentsoughtto disarm the WahdatPartyoutright.Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, leaderof the Pushtun-dominatedItteha-eIslamiandone of the closest allies of SaudiArabia,playeda destructive
role in the 1992-93confrontationsbetweenMas'udandthe WahdatParty.23In those
deadly confrontations,hundredsof Shi'ites were killed. In retaliation,the Wahdat
partyformed a fleeting alliance with Hekmatyarand Dostum in Januaryof 1994,
unleashingone of the deadliestrocketandartilleryattackson Kabul,reportedlykilling some 25,000 people.24
ThomasHobbes,
In short,life in Afghanistanduringthe civil war,to paraphrase
this prevalent
all.
It
was
from
with
war
of
all
and
short
the
was nasty,brutish,
against
climateof hopelessnessanddespairthatthe Talibanrose to power.

22. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Afghanistanand the Regional Powers,"Asian Survey,Vol. 33, No. 9
(September1993), pp. 905-922.
23. He studiedin SaudiArabiaandreceived"hundredsof millions of dollarsin Saudiaid,"Bergen,
Holy War,p. 54.
24. FundamentalismReborn,WilliamMaley,ed. (New York:New YorkUniversityPress,2001), p.
35.
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HELPINGCREATEA SPHEREOF RESISTANCE
AGAINSTTHE TALIBAN
The Talibanarose as an obscuregroupof young Pushtunreligiousstudents. It
began "as a kind of experimentalFrankensteinmonster"and was "createdin the
laboratories,so to speak, of Pakistaniintelligence,the ISI - in orderto producea
counter-forceto IranandIranianIslamism."25
Ironically,Iranwas astonishinglyslow
bothto deceleratethe phenomenallyfast rise of the Talibanmovementandto recognize its intrinsicallybelligerentoutlooktowardsIranand Shi'ism.
By mid-1994,underPrimeMinisterBenazirBhutto,Pakistanchangedthe directionof its Afghanpolicy.Pakistan,muchsoonerthanIran,hadconcludedthatthe
Afghangovernmentwas too hopelesslyincompetentanddividedto end the civil war.
Havingalso lost confidencein Hekmatyar,the ISI shiftedcovertlogisticalsupportto
the Taliban.The Saudi GeneralIntelligenceAgency, underPrinceTurkial-Faisal,
joined Pakistanin this endeavorandprovidedgenerousfinancialandmaterialsupport
to the Talibanin their attackon Kabul.26Neitherthe Afghangovernmentnor Iran
appearto have been fully awareof the substantialaid being covertly given to the
Taliban.Similarly,they did not connect the relevantdots to discover that a grand
designwas beinghatchedto establisha Pushtun-Saudi
style theocracyin Afghanistan.
(In 1994, two yearsbeforethe Talibanoverthrewthe governmentin Kabul,an explosion in the Shrineof ImamReza in Mashhadkilled 26 pilgrimsand injureddozens,
mostlywomen.Thereis some evidencethatthe bombingwas relatedto al-Qa'ida.27
)
The Afghan government,supportedby Iran, resortedto negotiationsand even attemptedto drivea wedge amongthe Pushtunsby appointingthe notoriousHekmatyar
as Prime Ministerof a "nationalunity"government.These maneuversall proved
futile.
The Taliban'sdazzlinglyrapidascent to power disorientedIranand forced it
into a defensiveandreactiveposture.Iransufferedits firstsetbackwhen 'Abdal-'Ali
Mazari,a prominentleaderof the Hezb-eWahdatwho was underfire by the forces of
Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, strucka deal with the Talibanin 1995. He did not enjoy a
happy fate, however, as he was taken into custody by the Talibanand later died
mysteriouslyin a helicoptercrash.AlthoughIran'srole in Mazari'sbizarredeal with
theTalibanremainsvague,his defectionweakenedtheShi'itesandfurtheremboldened
the Taliban.In the same year, Heratfell underTalibancontrol.This was a decisive
momentwhen Irancould have changedits course, but insteadit continuedwith its
failed policies and offered token supportto Isma'il Khan,Herat'sstrongman and
Iran'sally, who stagedan ineffectivecounteroffensiveandwas subsequentlyarrested
by the Taliban.TheTalibanultimatelyoverthrewRabbaniin 1996.This was a serious
25. Cooley, Unholy Wars,p. 146.
26. Rashid, Taliban,p. 201.
27. Accordingto MSNBC, RamzaiYousef,one of the plannersof the firstattackon the WorldTrade
Center in New York,and the "People's Mujahedin"(Mujahedin-eKhalq) were behind the massive
explosion. See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4677978/,
(p. 4).
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defeatfor Iran,and a fleeting victoryfor both Pakistanand SaudiArabia.
Duringthe Taliban'sdominance,Iran'spolicy was basedon fourpillars.Firstly,
it refusedto recognizetheTalibangovernmentandsoughtto returnRabbanito power.
Secondly,it supportedthe NorthernAlliance as a counterforceagainstthe Taliban.
Thirdly,it soughtto avoid any directmilitaryengagementwith the Taliban.Finally,
it aimedto intensifyits activitiesin the UnitedNations'"Six Plus Two"negotiations
concerningthe futureof Afghanistan.28
Not since the independenceof Afghanistan,in 1919, had therebeen an Afghan
governmentas antagonistictowardIran as the Taliban;not since SaddamHusayn
invadedIranin September1980 had any Iranianneighborposed as greata security
threatthanthe Taliban.IranfearedthatTalibanrule wouldincreaseinstabilityon its
easternbordersand acceleratethe flood of refugees into Iran.Tehranlabeled the
Taliban"narco-terrorists,"
who providedsanctuaryto terroristorganizationsandwho
"cherrypicked"elementsof bothIslamandPushtuntribaltraditionsto justify an unIslamicand repressiveideology.
The "Kabul-Islamabad-Riyadh"
axis generatedserious tension in Iran'srelations withPakistanandSaudiArabia,andonce againturnedAfghanistaninto a battlegroundfor a proxy war amongthem.Althoughthe threeregionalplayerswere diligentlycautiousto not allow the crisisto irretrievablydamagetheirotherwisefriendly
relations,theirdifferingagendascollided.While Pakistanprovidedgenerouslogistical, militaryand politicalsupportto the Taliban,SaudiArabiamagnanimouslygave
petrodollarsto them,hopingto spreadWahabismandstrengthenits role as a leaderof
the Islamic world. SaudiArabiadirectlyfundedthe notorioussecurityservice, the
Ministryof Enforcementof Virtueand Suppressionof Vice, whose antediluvianideology and draconianmeasurestransformedAfghanistaninto a repressivecountrysized prison.29
Both SaudiArabiaandPakistanalso shareda commoneconomicobjective: the
constructionof a 1,040-milelongTurkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
pipeline.30The
AmericanUNOCALandDelta Oil of SaudiArabiawere to be the mainfinanciersof
the project,which enjoyed some supportwithin the ClintonAdministration.Constructionof this $2.5 billion projectwas a majorstrategicchallengeto Iran,which
insistedthata pipelinethroughIranwouldbe muchcheaper,shorter,and safer.
SaudiArabiaand Pakistanused theirconsiderableclout in Washingtonto portraythe Talibanas a force thatcould restoreorder,neutralizeIran,andprovidea safe
gateway for US interestswithin CentralAsia. The Talibanplayed their own "Iran
card"ratherskillfully,portrayingthemselvesto be a bastionagainst"Iranianextrem28. They includedIran,Pakistan,China,Tajikistan,Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan,Russia,andthe US.
29. HumanRightsWatch,Afghanistan:Crisisof Impunity.TheRole of Pakistan,Russiaand Iranin
Fuelling the Civil War,Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2001 (c), p. 31. Accordingto the same report,the Ministry
of Enforcementof Virtue and Suppressionof Vice was the most powerful "governmentorgan"in
Afghanistan,p. 32.
30. Testimonyby JohnJ. Maresca, VicePresident,InternationalRelations, UNOCALCorporation
to House Committeeon InternationalRelations[Subcommitteeon Asia andthe Pacific],February12,
1998, p. 5.
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ism." They closed the IranianEmbassyin Kabulin 1997, accused Iran of blatant
interferencein Afghanistan,and pushedthe two countriesto the precipiceof war.
There were those in Washingtonwho did not initially view the Talibanas a major
threatto the UnitedStatesandwelcomedthe Talibanas a counterforceagainstIran.3"
AssistantSecretaryof State for SouthAsian Affairs,Robin L. Raphel,pointedout
as an "indigenousmovement"with "staythatthe Talibanhadto be "acknowledged"
the
Clinton
muchto its credit,refusedofficially
Still,
Administration,
ing power."32
to recognizethe Talibangovernment,and Secretaryof State MadelineAlbrightremainedoutspokenlycriticalof the Taliban'sblatantviolationsof humanrights. Only
SaudiArabia,Pakistan,andthe UnitedArabEmiratesrecognizedthe Talibangovernment.
Iranrefusedto recognizethe Taliban,assistedthe NorthernAlliance,andhelped
create a sphereof resistancewithinAfghanistan.In fact, Iranposed "the strongest
In seeking to oust the Taliban,Iran,
opposition to their [Taliban's]ascendancy."33
however,miscalculatedPakistan'sintentions.Publicly,bothcountriesinsistedthatthe
Afghancrisishadno militarysolution.In the wordsof PrimeMininsterNawazSharif,
who visitedTehranin Juneof 1997, all factionsin Afghanistan"shouldsit behinda
In pracnegotiatingtableandtry to resolvetheirdifferencesin a peacefulmanner."34
tice, however,neitherPakistannor the Talibanhad any such plan. This criticalfact
became abundantlyclear to Iran when the Talibanattemptedto captureMazar-eSharif,the interimcapitalof the NorthernAlliance.
In thatcrucialbattle,Iranprovidedkey supportto the NorthernAlliance,which
inflictedheavy causalitieson the Taliban.Withconsiderablelogistical supportfrom
Pakistan,the Talibanultimatelyprevailedin thatmelee. The Talibanthen proceeded
to commitgenocide,massacringmalemembersof the Hazara,Tajik,andUzbekcommunities- killing at least 2,000 people. They also took many prisonerswho were
in largecontainertruckscapableof holdingup to 150 people ... In two
"transported
knowninstances... nearlyall of the meninsidehadasphyxiatedor died of heatstroke
inside the closed metalcontainers."35
Infuriatedby the Iraniansupport,theTalibankidnappedeightIraniandiplomats
andone journalist.Iranreliedon diplomacyin an attemptto free the hostages,while
simultaneouslythreateningmilitaryforce by massingmorethan70,000 troopson its
31. In 1996, ZalmayKhalilzad(laterAmbassadorto post-TalibanAfghanistan)wrotethatalthough
theTalibanposed a threat,therearesome "commoninterestsbetweenthe UnitedStatesandtheTaliban."
See "Afghanistan:Time to Reengage,"TheWashingtonPost, October7, 1996. In 2000, he accusedthe
ClintonAdministration
of "underestimating
thethreatposedto regionalstabilityandto U.S. interests"by
the Taliban.See Z. KhalilzadandD. Byman, "Afghanistan:The Consolidationof a Rogue State,"The
WashingtonQuarterly(Winter2000), p. 66.
32. RichardMacKenize,"The United States and the Taliban,"FundamentalismReborn,William
Maley, ed. (New York: New YorkUniversityPress, 2001), pp. 35 and 91.
33. ShahidM. Amin, Pakistan'sForeignPolicy:A Reappraisal(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,
2000), p. 114.
34. Hamshahri,June 18, 1997; 28 Khordad1376.
35. HumanRights Watch:TheMassacrein MazariSharif;Vol. 10, No. 7, (c) November 1998, p. 2.
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easternborder.HojatolislamRafsanjanicondemnedhostagetakingas a violationof
the "establishednorms of diplomacy,"as if the Tehranhostage crisis of 1979 was
seemingly a fiction. HojatolislamHasan Rouhani,an influentialmemberof Iran's
foreign policy establishment,declaredthat Iranwas suspiciousof Pakistan'sintentions and that Pakistanwas ultimately"responsiblefor the safety of Iranianhostages."36Neitherthe threatof retaliationnor the endeavorsof diplomacyprovedeffective, however.In Septemberof 1998, the Taliban"found"the corpsesof the hostages, but acceptedno culpability.
Iranpromisedto punishthe "savage"Taliban,andbeganmassingsome 200,000
troopson its easternborder.The IranianForeignMinistryblamedPakistanoutright
for the deathof the hostages,while AyatollahKhameiniblamed"Americanoil and
gas companies,"as well as elements of the Pakistaniarmy,for the "TalibanconIran'stop leadership,includingPresidentMuhammadKhatamiandAyaspiracy."37
tollahsKhameiniandHashemiRafsanjaniopposedentanglementin anotherwar,however,andthus opposedmilitaryretaliationagainstthe Taliban.Rafsanjanireportedly
saidthat"Afghanistan
is like a swamp;anyonecan fall into it, buta few can get out of
it safely andundamaged"38
Iran's harshrhetoricand ultimatelyempty threatsspurredthe Talibanon to
increasingbelligerence.They ransackedthe Iranianculturalcenterin Mazar-eSharif,
settingthe libraryablaze,andviolentlycrushedan uprisingin Heratin May of 1999,
which they claimedwas instigatedby Iran.39 They intensifiedtheirruthlesspersecution of Shi'ites, particularlythe Hazara,labelingthem as infidels.40They decreased
the amountof life-givingwaterflowing fromthe HelmandRiverto Iran,forcingIran
to take the issue beforethe UnitedNations.
Throughoutthe ruleby the Taliban,Iran,India,andRussiaprovidedsupportfor
the NorthernAlliance, while the majorityof the rest of the world remainedcoldly
silent regardingthe Taliban'segregiousviolationsof Afghans'basic humanrights.
Irandispatchedmilitaryinstructorsto the NorthernAlliance, with the WahdatParty
andAhmadShahMas'udreceivingthe lion's share.An estimated80 to 150 men were
being trainedby Iranianmilitaryinstructorsat any given time.4'Until late 2002, Iran
was the "principalsourceof militaryassistanceto the UnitedFront,providingsignifi-

36. Hamshahri,August 17, 1998, 26 Mordad 1377.
37. Hamshahri,September15, 1998, 24 Shahrivar1377.
38. The author'sinterviewwith an Iranianuniversityprofessor,Tehran,March2001.
39. GholamrezaAmirkhani,"Afghanistan'sLost Splendor,"AmericanLibraries,December2001,
p. 19. Directorof Iran'sNationalLibrary,AmirKahniclaims thatthe Talibandestroyedanotherlibrary
with 55,000 volumes at Pol-e Khomri.See also, VahidMojdeh,AfghanistanVaPanj Sal-e Solte-ye
Taliban[Afghanistan:Five Yearsof Dominanceby the Taliban](Tehran,Nashrani,2002); andAbdullah
Rafiee,KabulTaBaghdad[FromKabulto Baghdad](Tehran:The Pressof Iran'sArmedForces,2003).
Rafiee offers a militaryandstrategicanalysisof the recentevents in IranandAfghanistan.
The site providesinformationon the
40. Fordetails, see www.hazara.net/taliban/fitwa/fitwa.html.
recently-discoveredmass gravesof the victims of the Taliban.
41. HumanRightsWatch:Crisis of Impunity;Therole of Pakistan,Russiaand Iranin Fundingthe
Civil War,Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 39-40.
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Thereis much truthto the assertionby a
cant levels of the weaponsand training."42
seniorAfghan governmentsource that "withoutIran,most NorthernAlliance commanderscouldn't have operatedin Afghanistanat a time when they had no other
sourceof internationalsupport."43
It is said thatone differencebetweenmoderatesandextremistsis thatthe latter
do not know when to stop. What sealed the fate of the Talibanwas not only the
NorthernAlliance,butthe Taliban'ssymbioticrelationshipwith the al-Qa'ida,which
sponsoredthe barbaricattackson the UnitedStateson September11, 2001. By refusing to extraditeBin Ladinto the US, the Talibanwroteits own obituary.

THE FALLOF THE TALIBANAND US-IRAN
COMPETITIONIN AFGHANISTAN
The forcibleremovalof the Talibanby the UnitedStates was an unintentional
gift to Iranthatcreateda strategicconfigurationwith both enticingopportunitiesas
well as dangersfor Iran.One benefitfor Iranwas thatthe fall of the Taliban,Iran's
nemesis, forcedPakistanand SaudiArabia,Iran'smaincompetitorsin Afghanistan,
into a defensive posture.They had gambledhigh stakes by bettingon the monster
they created,and they lost it all. Pakistanmade a deathbedconversion,joining the
and was rewardedby the US with lucrativefinancialassistance
"Waron Terrorism,"
and the removal of economic sanctions which had been imposed in response to
Pakistan'snucleartests.Although15 out of the 19 knownexecutorsof the September
1Ithterroristattackscamefromthe Kingdom,SaudiArabiawas gracefullyallowedby
Washingtonto disappeargently fromthe politicalradarof Afghanistan.Today,Saudi
Arabiais quietlyengagedin the reconstructionof Afghanistan.
Tehranwas delightedto see its friendsin the NorthernAllianceregainconsiderable power in Kabul.AlthoughIranviewed the presenceof thousandsof American
troopsin Afghanistanwith trepidation,and did not welcome the UnitedStatesas its
new neighbor,it was cautiouslyoptimisticthatthe commongoal of fightinga perfidious enemy in the Talibanwould acceleratethe rapprochement
with the US that had
the
last
of
the
ClintonAdministration.
begunduring
years
This optimismwas further
strengthenedby the fact that PresidentGeorge W. Bush was viewed in Tehranas
being closely linkedto the oil industry;Vice-PresidentDick Cheneywas also fondly
rememberedfor callingfor a partialliftingof unilateralUS sanctionson Iranwhenhe
led Halliburton.Moreover,therewere secret,back-channeltalksin Genevaregarding
Afghanistanbetweenthe United States and Iran,even beforethe September11th attacks."4
42. HumanRights Watch:Crisis of Impunity,p. 35.
43. Thomas H. Johnson, "IsmailKhan, Heartand IranianInfluence,"StrategicInsights, Vol. III,
Issue 7, July 2004, p. 3.
44. Fordetails, see MohsenAminzadeh,Diplomasee-yeIranaz dourey-eKhatamito Ahmadinejad
[Iranian Diplomacy from Khatami to Ahmadinjead]. Sharagonline.ir/spe/spe/archives/
2005_327_19_23_28_Print.php. Sharagnewspaper,a reform-orientednewspaper,conductedan indepthinterviewwith Mr.Aminzadeh,a top official of the IranianForeignMinistryunderKhatami.
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Therewereadditional,morecompellingreasonsforthisoptimisticattitudewithin
Iran.On one hand, the United States' popularitywas at its peak. The remarkable
popularsympathywith the innocentvictims of the September11th terrorattacks,as
evidencedby spontaneousvigils and denunciationsof Bin Ladinin the mass media,
was morevisible in Iranthanin otherIslamiccountries.On the otherhand,President
Khatami,one of the first world leadersto condemnthe September11th terroristattacksas being anti-Islamicandbarbaric,hadheavilyinvestedin his "dialogueamong
civilizations,"and thus favoredimprovedrelationswith the US. Underthese auspicious conditions,Irancame to play an importantrole in the campaignto overthrow
the Taliban.
Twodays beforethe terroristattackson the UnitedStates,AhmadShahMas'ud,
the leaderof the NorthernAlliance, was assassinated,most likely by al-Qa'ida.Anticipatinga militaryretaliationby the UnitedStateson Afghanistanin responseto the
impendingterroristattacks,the assassinsundoubtedlyhopedto decapitateanddisorient the NorthernAlliance and createa vacuumin leadership,thus complicatingany
Americanmilitaryintervention.Onlya day afterthe assassination,however,the leadershipvacuumwas filled; with Iran'shelp, a leadershipcouncil consistingof "Marshal Fahim,Dr.Abdullah,andGhanounni"was formed.45Soon thereafterthe United
Statesbeganto workclosely with the NorthernAlliance,andIranianadvisorsrubbed
shoulderswithAmericanmilitarypersonnelin the NorthernAlliancecontrolledareas.
Additionally,Tehranannouncedthatit wouldprovidesanctuaryto distressedAmerican militarypersonnelinside Iranianterritory,and allowedthe US to transportfood
and humanitarian
goods to AfghanistanthroughIran'sterritory.A top official of the
IranianForeignMinistryunderKhatamiclaims that it becameratherclear in Iran's
back-channeltalks with the US thatWashington"didnot have a clear plan for the
post-TalibanAfghanistan,"and that Iran offered advice and warnedthe US about
He also claims that "Americanspaid attentionto
majorfault lines in Afghanistan.46
our [Iran's]sensitivities."It is reportedthatIraneven "broughtout mapsto try to tell
the UnitedStatesthe best targetsto bomb"in Afghanistan.47
Iran's participationin the UN-brokered,US-sponsoredBonn Conferencein
The majorAfghanfactionsparticipated
Decemberof 2001 was equallysignificant.48
in the conferenceand signed the Bonn Agreement,laying the groundworkfor the
futureof the Afghangovernment.Iranandthe US favoreda new governmentfree of
the Taliban,and agreedon many othercriticalissues. Dr. MuhammadJavadZarif,
Iran'sobserverat the conference,was askedby the US to intervenewhentalksstalled:
"We[Iranians]allowedGeneralFahim[of the NorthernAlliance]to bringonly one
45. See Diplomasee-yeIran, p. 5.
46. See Diplomasee-yeIran, p. 5.
47. See James Risen, State of War:The Secret History of the CIAand the Bush Administration
(New York:Free Press, 2006) p. 215. Risen's claim has not been corroboratedby Iran,nor does he
identifyhis source.
48. Forthe Bonn Agreement,see Reportfor Congress: Afghanistan: Challengesand Optionsfor
Reconstructinga StableandModerateState(Washington,DC: CongressionalResearchService,2002),
Appendix 1.
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division inside Kabul,and provedall of Pakistan'sfear of a bloodbathto be baseless."49Althoughit originally favoredan interimgovernmentheadedby Rabbani,
Irandroppedits proposalin supportof HamidKarzai,who was the US choice. Iran
also pressureda reluctantIsma'il Khan,the self-appointedEmirof Herat,to support
Karzai.
During the first year of the new Afghan government,the rapprochementbetween the United States and Irancontinuedas they competedfor influence in Afghanistan.On January3rd,2002, however,IsraeliDefense Forcescapturedwhatthey
claimedto be a PalestinianAuthority-ownedfreighter,the KarineA, loadedwith 50
tons of weapons.The IDF Chief of GeneralStaff, ShaulMofaz,who is an Iranianby
birth,confirmedthat some of the confiscatedweaponswere Iranianmade.50It was
also reportedthatthe freighterhadbeen loadedwith weaponsin Iran. AlthoughIran
dismissedthe allegationas an "Israeliconspiracy"to derailUS-Irannegotiationsover
Afghanistan,the incidentneverthelessbecamea catalystfor the rapiddeteriorationof
US-Iranrelations.A few weeks afterthe incident,PresidentBush includedIranas a
memberof the "Axisof Evil"in his January2002 Stateof the Union speech.
Afterthe presidentialspeech,the rhetoricfromWashingtonandTehranreturned
to a hostile and threateningtone. HashemiRafsanjaniclaimedthatthe US intended
"tomakea nestfor themselveshere[CentralAsia]."ThePasdarancommanderwarned
thatthe next targetafterAfghanistanwouldbe Iraq,andthenothercountries.Hassan
Rouhaniclaimedthat "theBush Doctrine"was designedto destabilizeIran."5'Iran
defiantlyreleasedHekmatyar,who quicklyjoined the anti-Karzaiforces.52In Washington,GeorgeTenet,Directorof the CentralIntelligenceAgency,declaredthatIran's
initial signs of cooperationhad "eclipsed"and that "whileIran'sofficials express a
sharedinterestin a stablegovernmentin Afghanistan,its securityforces appearbent
on counteringthe US presence.This seemingcontradictionin behaviorreflectsdeepseatedsuspicionsamongTehran'sclerics thatthe US is committedto encirclingand
overthrowingthem."53ZalmayKhalilzad,PresidentBush'senvoyto Afghanistanand
now US envoy to Iraq,condemnedIran'sun-electedofficials - a clear referenceto
conservativeclerics- for destabilizingAfghanistan,suggestingthatthey"feelthreatened by the emergenceof a moderateand Western-oriented
Afghanistanthat might
encouragethe Iranianpeople to demandthe same for theirown country."54He accused Iranof harboringmembersof al-Qa'ida,andof sendingsubversiveelementsto
fomentmischiefin Afghanistan,a claimbothIranandthe Karzaigovernmentdenied.

49. KavehAfrasiabiand Abbas Maleki, "Iran'sForeignPolicy After 11 September,"The Brown
Journalof WorldAffairs,VolumeIX, Issue 2 (Winter/Spring2003), p. 259; see also Zarif's interview
with Time,January25, 2002.
50. wwwjewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/peace/paship.html.
51. Hamshahri,July 20, 2002, 29 Tir, 1381.
52. Risen, State of War,p. 215.
53. GeorgeJ. Tenet,"WorldwideThreat,"Testimonybeforethe SenateArmedServicesCommittee,
March19, 2002, p. 6. See: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/2002/senateselectLhearing03 192002.html.
54. ZalmayKhalilzad,"Speechto theAmerican-Iranian
Council,"March13, 2002.
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Despitethe harshrhetoricbetweenWashingtonandTehran,Iran'sAfghanpolicy
did not change afterthe "Axisof Evil" speech.This lack of shift in policy lent credence to a suggestionby a Westerndiplomatthat "Iran'sgame is to be publiclyobstructiveand privatelyconstructive."55

IRANAND KARZAIIN THEKHATAMIERA
WithHamidKarzaias the headof the InterimAuthority,andwith the Northern
Alliance as a majorpowerbrokerin the new government,Iranreformulatedits Afghan policy to achieve four main goals: to collaboratewith the Karzaigovernment
withoutabandoningits supportfor Iran'sotheralliesin Afghanistan;to engageheavily
in the reconstructionof Afghanistanin orderto createan "economicsphereof influence" and transformHeratinto a bufferzone; to avoid directconfrontationwith the
US while pressuringKabulgraduallyto reduceUS influence;andto reducethe flow
of narcoticsto Iran.
Thebilateralrelationsweregenerallyfriendly.Karzaiappealedto boththeUnited
StatesandIrannot to allow theirdifferencesto poisontheirpolicies towardAfghanistan.Whilehe cannotsurvivewithoutgenerousUS support,KarzairecognizesIran's
potentialto fomentinstabilityby unifyinghis opponents.Karzaihas repeatedlypaid
tributeto the "unforgettable
support"of Iran,which has "behavedlike the brotherof
theAfghanpeople."In his officialvisit to Afghanistanin 2002, PresidentMuhammad
Khatamideclaredthat"today,theAfghannationhas a governmentthatis basedon its
own will ... the stabilityand securityof Afghanistanis the same as ourown security
andstability."56Moreover,the two countriessigneda numberof bilateralagreements
dealingwith issues rangingfrom fightingterrorismto economiccooperation.57
The bilateralrelations,however,were not devoid of tension.The statusof Afghan refugees, estimatedto be over 2 million with only 900,000 of them properly
identified,was a continuingsource of frictionbetween the two neighbors.58Some
refugees returnedto their homelandsince the fall of the Taliban,but a significant
numberreturnedto Iran.59The presenceof the multinationaltroopsin Afghanistan
was also a sensitiveissue. While Karzaifavorstheirpresenceto consolidatehis own
ruleandto stabilizethe country,Irandemandstheirwithdrawal.Finally,the "pipeline
politics"continuedto taintrelationsbetweenthe two countries:Iran'svehementoppipeline,andits own proposed$7
positionto the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
Iran-Pakistan
kilometer
pipeline,angeredmanyAfghans,who accuse
billion, 2,600
55. Romesh Ratnesar,"Tehran'sGame,"Time,February4, 2002, p. 42.
56. "Karzai,KhatamiPressConference,"BBCMonitoring,SouthAsia, RadioAfghanistan(Kabul),
August 13, 2002.
57. Hamshahri,February27, 2002, 8 Esfend 1383.
58. BBC Persian, February 19, 2006. www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/02/printable/
0602 19_mv-afghans-iran.shtml.
59. ForeignMinisterMattakiis quotedas saying thatthe IranianEmbassyin Afghanistanis issuing
up to 2,000 visas perday. "Afghanistan,IranSign ConsularCooperationAgreement,"BBC Worldwide
Monitoring,SouthAsia, December26, 2005.
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Iranof underminingtheircountry'seconomic well-being.
Fromthe Iranianperspective,the mostcontentiousissues, however,wereopium
productionin Afghanistan,Karzai'srecentcampaignto underminethe powerof warlordsfriendlyto Iran,andhis policy of increasingthe Puhstunpresencein his government.Afghanistanis producingmore opium today than it ever producedunderthe
Taliban,and has become "a narco-state."IIn 2005, total exportvalue of opium to
neighboringcountrieswas a staggering$2.7 billion, or about52% of Afghanistan's
$5.2 billion GDP.6'Althoughopium production in 2005 was slightly lower than
2004, it is still dangerouslyhigh. Iranhas been cautiousnot to blameKarzaidirectly,
even if hundredsof its securityforces have recentlybeen killed in clashes with traffickers.As usual,the UnitedStatesis labeledas the easy scapegoat:"Arethesepeople
[Americans]who with the aid of their satellitesmonitorthe car numbersof the Afghansin the desertsto trackdown terroristsunableto detectpoppyfarms?"62
asked
Rafsanjani.Opiumproductionanddistributiongeneratessubstantialrevenuesfor terroristgroupsandsubversiveelementswhichcouldfurtherdestabilizethe 560 miles of
commonbordersbetweenIranandAfghanistan.
Karzai'spolicies to centralizeKabul'sauthorityand to increasethe Pushtun
presencein the governmentgeneratednew stressin the bilateralrelations.Thesepolicies are incompatiblewith Iran'sposition that a truly multi-ethnic,federalAfghan
system, with both a strongcenterandequallystrongprovinces,is the most effective
systemfor insuringstabilityin Afghanistan.Thereare now disturbingsigns that"inter-ethnictension"has been exacerbated.63
In Karzai'scabinetin 2003, for example,
Tajiks,Uzbeks,and Shi'ites were well represented,while the NorthernAlliancecontrolled the defense and foreign ministries.' After the presidentialelection in 2004,
Karzai,a DurraniPushtun,has increasedthe representation
of the Pushtunsunderthe
pretextof bringingtechnocracyto his cabinet.65
to thispolicy of Pushtunization
Complementary
is the campaignto "demobilize,
disarmandreintegrate"
(DDR)thecentrifugalforces.Towardthisgoal, Karzaistripped
Isma'il Khanof his governorshipof Herat.GeneralMuhammadFahimwas also removed as one of Afghanistan'svice-presidents.Despite these changes, Karzai'sauthorityhas not extendedfar beyond Kabul.The power bases of Isma'il Khan and
Fahimhave not been eroded,and they remaininfluentialfigures.It is estimatedthat
60. ThomasH. Johnson,"TheProspectsfor Post-ConflictAfghanistan:A Call of the Sirens to the
Country'sTroubledPast,"StrategicInsights,VolumeV, Issue 2 (February2006), p. 2.
61. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,SummaryFindingsof OpiumTrendsin Afghanistan, 2005, September12, 2005, p.1. See: www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/2005SummaryFindingsOfOpium
TrendsAfghanistan.pdf.
62. "RafsanjaniCondemnsIsraeliAttacksAgainstPalestinianRefugee Camps,"BBCMonitoring,
SouthAsiafrom Voiceof Islamic Republicof Iran, March8, 2002.
63. Johnson,The Prospects, p. 17.
64. See the Hizb-e Wahdat,http://geocities.comlwahdat_magazine/governmental.html.
See also
Johnson,TheProspects, p. 5.
65. Johnson,TheProspects,pp. 5, 8 and 17;GulshanDietl, "War,Peace andtheWarlords:The Case
of IsmailKhanof Heratin Afghanistan,"Alternatives:TurkishJoumal of InternationalRelations,Vol.
3, Nos. 2 &3 (Fall 2004), pp. 41-66.
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Fahimhas a 50,000-strongmilitiaunderhis personalcommand.66
Karzai'srecentmaneuvershavesurelyincreasedthe bilateraltension.Although
Karzaihas indicatedon many occasions that "Iranhas never interferedin internal
thereis some evidenceto the contrary.67Duringthe presidenaffairsof Afghanistan,"
tial election in 2004, while Iran was publicly supportingthe elections, it used the
Mashhadradio,broadcastin Persian,to questionthe legitimacyof the election,calling Karzaithe "stoogeof the US."68 Anis,an Afghannewspaper,has accusedIranof
fomentinganti-USsentiment,citing the protestover allegeddesecrationof the Koran
as an example,a chargeIranvehementlydenies.69

IRANAND AFGHANRECONSTRUCTION
One of the main objectivesof Iranis to createan "economicsphereof influence" in Afghanistan,with the ultimategoal of becomingthe hub for the transitof
goods and servicesbetweenthe PersianGulf, Afghanistan,CentralAsia, China,and
India.Clearly,the economic sphereof influencewould also enhanceIran'spolitical
and securityobjectives.At the InternationalPledgingConferencein Tokyo,in January of 2002, Irancommitted$560 million towardsAfghan reconstruction,making
Iranthe leadingcontributor;Iranpledgedapproximately12%of the total$4.5 billion
reconstructionassistance.Duringthe LondonConferenceon AfghanistanReconstruction in 2006, Iranpledged an additional$100 million, and announcedthat the last
installmentof its original$560 million commitmentwould be deliveredbefore the
end of 2006.70
The bulk of these Iranianinvestmentslie in the Herat region, and involve
infrastructural
projects,road and bridgeconstruction,education,agriculture,power
generation,and telecommunicationsprojects.Iranhas helpedrebuildAfghanistan's
radio and television infrastructure,and has increasedits own radio and television
programsin Dari. From2002-2003, a total of $1.5 billion of exportsflowed to Afghanistan;Iran'ssharewas only $120 million.7"The amountof tradehas increased
significantlysince 2002, thanksto improvedroadways,lower tariffs,and new customs checkpoints.In 2005, the annualvalue of the tradewas increasedto $250 mil66. Dietl, "War,Peace and the Warlords,"p. 58.
67. Hamshahri,February27, 2002, 8 Esfend 1383.
68. See Bill Samii, "TehranTalks Out of Both Sides of Mouth on Afghan Election,"RFE/RL
Newsline,Vol. 8, No. 197, October18, 2004. Manyothersquestionedthe legitimacyandfairnessof the
elections. See, for example,M. Nazif Shahrani,"Afghanistan'sPresidentialElections:SpreadingDemocracy or a Sham?' Middle East Report Online, October 8, 2004. For the problemsof building
democracyin Afghanistan,see BarnettR. Rubin, "(Re)BuildingAfghanistan:The Folly of Stateless
Democracy,"CurrentHistory, 103 (April2004), pp. 165-170
69. "WeShouldNot Fall Victim to Behind-the-ScenesPoliticking,"BBC Monitoring,SouthAsia,
Anis, May 19, 2005.
70. BBCPersian,January31, 2006. See: www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2006/0l/printable/06013I_he_afghanaids_html.
71. "IranExports$1Omto Afghanistan,"BBC,MonitoringInternationalReportsfromIRNA,October 1, 2002.
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lion.72

Iranalso allocatedsome $43 millionto improvea 125-kilometer"GoldenTransit Route,"linkingthe Dougharounregionin Iranto Herat.73The highwaywas inauguratedwhen Karzaivisited Iranin 2005. Iranhas also announcedits biggest project
in the comingyears:the constructionof a 176-kilometerrailroadfromIranto the city
of Herat.4 Iranhas also providedloans and grantsto Tajikistanfor the construction
of a 5 kilometerAnzabtunnel.Once completed,this transitroad,reminiscentof the
Silk Road,wouldeventuallyconnectIran,throughHerat,Mazar-eSharif,andTajikistan,to China.Iranhas signed agreementswithAfghanistan,Tajikistan,and Uzbekistanto provideaccess to internationalroutesfor those threelandlockedcountries.
Iranis also upgradinga tax-freetraderoute, linking the Oman-basedport of
Chabaharto the southwesternborderpost of Malikin Afghanistan,and to Kandahar
and Kabul.Once completed,it would greatlydiminishthe economic importanceof
the Karachi-Kandahar
road,which is Afghanistan'sonly currentroadwayto international markets.The road would shortenthe distancefrom the PersianGulf to Afghanistanby some700 kilometers;it wouldofferAfghanistan
therightto use Chahbahar
with a substantialdiscounton portfees; and it would also improveliving conditions
in Baluchestan,one of Iran'spoorestprovinces.75
Iranis additionallyallocatingsubto
Malik
stantialresources upgradethe
Bridgeover the HelmandRiver,as well as to
border.76
upgradeanotherbridgeover the ParianRiveron the Iran-Afghanistan

IRAN,HERATAND THE US
It is in the Heratregion that Iran'sinfluence in Afghanistanis most visible.
Until 1857, Heratwas consideredan "integralpart"of Iran.77When the Britishrepelled IranianadvancestowardHerat,Iranand the UK signedthe Treatyof Parisin
Marchof 1857. AlthoughIranabandonedits historicclaim on Herat,it reservedthe
right,underArticleVII, to send forces into Afghanistan"if its frontieris violated."78
Since then, Iranhas occasionallysought to keep Heratas a bufferzone. For a few
years, Isma'il Khan,the Emirof Herat,helpedIranto realizethatgoal.
Today,Heratis arguablythe most stableand prosperousregionin Afghanistan,
relativelyfree from al-Qa'idaand the Taliban.A small industrialcity has been con-
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structed,makingit the industrialheartlandof the country.79Herat'sbazaarsare reportedlyloadedwith Iranianproducts,andthe presenceof the IranianRevolutionary
Guardsis noticeableas well. It is estimatedthatbetween"100 to 400 trucks"and "at
least 500 cars"cross Iranianbordersto andfromHeratdaily.Theycarrya varietyof
goods to AfghanistanandPakistanfromIran,as well as fromDubai.80The maverick
Isma'il Khanreportedlywas earningas much as $3 million a monthfrom customs
alone,81a huge portionof which is generatedfromtradewith Iran.
The US andIranhavebeenengagedin a low-keycompetitionin Herat,reminiscent of the GreatGame of the 19thCentury. Isma'il Khanwas apt at playing that
game: "boththe U.S. andIran,"he said, "wantthe samethingin Heratthatwe want:
stability,prosperity,and peace."82
Isma'il Khan,like many otherwarlords,developedfriendlyrelationswith the
US: "Accordingto his [Khan's]securityguards,the Americansare providingrudiSo close was the Khanto the
mentarymilitarytrainingto some of Khan'ssoldiers."83
US thathe "is permittingSpecial Forcessoldiersto live in a hilltopfortresshe built
for himself when he was Harat'sgovernorfrom 1992-1995."84
The Khan had excellent relationswith Iran as well. He reportedlyreceived
Iraniansupportin his escape from a Talibanprison. Sensitive to Iraniansecurity
concerns,he publiclyrejectedthe need for foreignforcesin the region:"if they come
here andhave an everydaypresence,it will bringa reactionagainstthem."Justas he
deniedreceivingsupportfromthe US, he also deniedany militarysupportfromIran:
Therewere, however,
"so the Americansshould not worry so much about Iran."85
reportsthatIranian-trained
Afghansjoined the Khan'sforces, which were estimated
to be between50,000-60,000 strong.86
As PresidentKarzaibeganto centralizeauthorityandinstituteda policy to "demobilize,disarmandreintegrate"warlords,Isma'ilKhanbecameone of the policy's
first victims. Initially,the Khanwas askedto stop using the honorifictitle "Emirof
the SouthwestAfghanistan."Later,in Juneof 2003, he was forcedto handover $20
million to the state treasury.87Finally,PresidentKarzairemovedIsma'il Khanas
governorof Heratin Septemberof 2004; he was replacedwith Sayid Muhmmad
This provedto be a setbackfor Iran,althoughthe decisionhas hadlittle
Khairkhwa.88
overallimpacton Iran'sgrowinginfluencein the region.SeyyedHosseinAnvari,the
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new governor,has also developedgood relationswith Iran.He is, however,no Isma'il
Khan,who now serves in the cabinet as an ineffectualministerof an unimportant
ministry.

AHMADINEJADAND AFGHANISTAN
Afterthe US invasionof Iraqin 2003, Afghanistanwas no longera top priority
for Iran.Once again, IraqovershadowedIran'sotherregionalconcerns.It is ironic
that US policies helped transformIraninto a regionalpower,by removingthe two
mainsecuritythreatsto the IslamicRepublic:the TalibanandIraqiPresidentSaddam
Husayn.The invasionof Iraq,has, among other things, energizedIraqiShi'ites. In
the short time since the fall of Saddam,Iranhas developedexceptionallyfriendly
relationswith the Iraqigovernmentandhas also createda sophisticatedandmultilayered "sphereof influence"withinIraqthatis much morepowerfulthanthe one createdin almostthreedecadesof diplomacyin Afghanistan.89
As those majorstrategictransformations
were takingplace in the regionandas
Iran'snuclearenergyprogramsandpolicies becamea contentiousissue betweenthe
WestandIran,Dr.MahmudAhmadinejadwon the presidencyof Iran.He has formulated a "security-centered"
and "Islam-centered"
foreign policy that in some ways
resemblesIran'sforeignpolicy in the 1980s.Withhis new confrontationalapproach,
Ahmadinejadhas substantiallyincreasedIran'sisolation.His incendiaryand reprehensiblecommentto "wipeIsraeloff the map"andhis recklessdenialof the horrorof
the Holocausthavegeneratedunnecessarytensionin Iran'srelationswith manycountries.His "titfor tat"foreignpolicy assumesthatIranhas given too manyconcessions
to the West, particularlyto the United States, withoutbeing sufficientlyrewarded;
thatIran'sstrategicpositionin the regionandin the Islamicworldis favorablewhile
thatof the US is not;andthatIranhas to formulatea proactiveratherthanan appeasing foreignpolicy.Morethanhis predecessors,he is thuslikely to use Iran'sinfluence
andnetworksin Afghanistanto counteranyoffensiveagainstIranor to enhanceIran's
otherobjectives.
Still,Ahmadinejad'spresidencyhas not,thusfar,changedthe directionof Iran's
policy towardAfghanistan,nor has it lessened Iran'scommitmentto Afghanreconstruction,as evidencedby Iran'sparticipationin the LondonConferenceon Reconstructionof Afghanistanand its pledge of $100 million in 2006. While visitingAfghanistanin Decemberof 2005, ForeignMinisterManouchehrMattakiechoed the
sentimentof manyotherIranianleaders:"wearelike one soul in two bodies ... we are
and will be standingby each other."90
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Even before the beginningof the Ahmadinejadpresidency,however,Karzai's
Pushtunizationpolicy as well as his attemptto centralizeauthorityand diminishthe
powerof forces friendlyto Iranhadgeneratedsome uneasinessin the otherwiseamicable relationsbetweenIranandAfghanistan.These tensionshave not disappeared.
The presenceof multinationalforces in Afghanistanis, however,one areawherethe
AhmadinejadAdministrationis showinga slightpolicy change.In fact,Ahmadinejad
has not only maintainedthat the presenceof the multinationalforces is a cause of
instabilityin Afghanistan,he has hintedthat Iran'sreconstructionprojectsmay be
impeded.Thus, Iranhas recentlydemandeda timetablefor the withdrawalof multinationalforces fromAfghanistan.9'
Iranalso is keepingall its optionsopenin Afghanistanandseems to havecalculatedthatthe countrywill not be stabilizedanytimesoon. The currentsituationin Iraq
has certainlycontributedto the overall instabilityin Afghanistanand thus has increasedIran'sability to fomenttrouble,if it so chooses. In 2005, the Talibanresurfaced, emboldenedby the terroristactivities of their brethrenin Iraq against the
CoalitionforcesandShi'ites.Therehavebeenincreasedoccurrencesof suicidebombings, roadsidebombing,ambushes,and kidnappingsin Afghanistan.Some former
Talibanandreligiousextremistshaveeven foundnew legitimacyas electedmembers
of the WolesiJirga.Hekmatyarand his militiahave also been reactivated.
Iran'scurrentpolicy towardAfghanistanis unlikelyto changein the nearfuture
unlessthereis a majorpoliticalchangein Afghanistan,Iranis attackedby the United
States,its nuclearfacilitiesare struck,or Washingtonpursues"regimechange"as its
official policy towardTehran.

CONCLUSION
While Iranian foreign policy has certainly been guilty in many cases of
adventurismand extremism,Iran'spolicy towardAfghanistanhas contributedmore
to overall stability and moderationthan to instabilityand extremism.It is rather
soberingto quote Bamett R. Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan:"the United
while Irancourted
States[in the 1980s] was indirectlyalignedwith 'fundamentalists'
the moderates."92
Iran,like otherregionalplayers,addedfuel to the bloody Afghan
civil war. Underthe Taliban,Iranprovidedsupportto the sameforces thatultimately
collaboratedwith the UnitedStatesto overthrowthe Taliban.Since the liberationof
Afghanistan,Iranhas followed a moderatepolicy andhas engagedin the reconstruction of thatcountry.
Some aspectsof Iran'sAfghanpolicy areclearlyantitheticalto US interests,but
the two countriesdo sharesome commonobjectives.These sharedobjectivesinclude
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the establishmentof a stableAfghanistan,free from the Talibanand al-Qa'ida;the
reconstructionof that country;and the fight againstnarcotics.In overthrowingthe
Talibanand forminga new government,the United States and Irancollaboratedat
some criticaljunctures,and in the processestablisheda workingmodel of cooperation. They would be well-advised to take a chapterfrom that previous playbook,
shouldthey decide to negotiatein the future.
AlthoughIranis in a more favorablestrategicposition in Afghanistanand in
Iraqthan it has been in decades,Tehranmust rememberthat the United States has
virtuallyencircledIranwith morethan 150,000troopsin both IraqandAfghanistan.
It would be very costly, if not impossible,for Iranto solidify its recentgains as a
regionalpower in one of the most importantregionsof the world withoutreaching
some kind of understandingwith the United States,the world'slast hyperpower.In
the event of a militaryconfrontationwith the US over Iran'snuclearprograms,Iran
could undoubtedlyfoment troublefor the US in Afghanistan,Iraq, Lebanon,and
elsewhere.Ultimately,however,Iranwouldlose disproportionately
morethanthe US
in such a conflict.Only throughdialogueandnegotiation,ratherthanangrydiatribes
and confrontation,will Iranand the United States avoid a devastatingclash, whose
reverberationscould be felt throughoutthe MiddleEast.

